Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C (sec.) 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment Claims by Williams, Corbett H.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
8-1-2006
Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison
Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42
U.S.C (sec.) 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment
Claims
Corbett H. Williams
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Corbett H. Williams, Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C (sec.) 1997e(e)
in Prisoner First Amendment Claims, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 859 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol39/iss2/9
EVISCERATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND
INTERPRETATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) IN
PRISONER FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Jeff Royal was tried and convicted for cattle rustling.1
Before his five-year prison term commenced, however, he injured his
spinal cord in a farming accident and was thereafter confined to a
wheelchair. 2  As a result of this physical disability, the state
incarcerated Royal as an inmate at the Iowa Medical and
Classification Center (IMCC). 3 There, prison officials subjected him
to retaliation and humiliation.4 Specifically, the facility's medical
director confiscated his wheelchair, which forced him to crawl on the
floor.5 This retaliatory conduct was in response to Royal's filing of a
complaint in federal court alleging, among other things, that "he
could not turn his wheelchair in his cell," that "he was unable to get
to the toilet or shower," and that "he had to lay on the floor after
using the toilet to pull on his prison-issue jumpsuit." 6 After Royal
filed a petition to recover his wheelchair, IMCC's security director
"issued a memorandum stating that any inmate seen crawling on the
floor would be subject to discipline."'7  Royal's wheelchair was
returned to him only after a neurosurgeon determined that the
crutches he was given as a substitute were exerting pressure on his
ulnar nerve.
8
1. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting). "Cattle rustling" denotes theft of bovine cattle. Galeppi v. C.
Swanston & Son, 290 P. 116, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
2. Royal, 375 F.3d at 726 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
3. See id. at 726-27.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 726.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 726-27.
8. Id. at 727. The ulnar nerve runs along the arm, from the shoulder to the
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When Royal sought redress in federal court, IMCC officials
placed him in isolation (or "lock up") for nearly two months to
prevent him from prosecuting his claims and thereafter transferred
him to another facility.9 After Royal was released on parole, he
brought a successful suit against LMCC and its officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.10 Although a federal judge held that by placing him
in isolation prison officials had violated his First Amendment right to
petition for redress of his grievances," the only remedy the law
afforded Jeff Royal was $1.00 in nominal damages and $1.50 in
attorney fees. 12
Jeff Royal's case is not unique, nor will it be the last of its kind.
It is the product of a broad reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a single
subsection of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which
became law in 1996 upon President Clinton's signature. 13 Congress
enacted the PRLA to curtail what it perceived as a flood of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits in the federal courts.1 4 While it appears there was
little debate in Congress regarding the potential impact of
§ 1997e(e), 15 there were many anecdotal references to the most
hand. The portion of the ulnar nerve that passes along the elbow is what is
commonly known as the funny bone. See Wikipedia, Ulnar Nerve,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulnarnerve (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
9. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 727 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The penal system
uses many euphemisms to describe the punitive measure of isolation. Isolation
generally entails twenty-three hours per day of cell confinement, narrow
limitations on human contact, denial of the usual activities of prison life, and
endless hours of monotony and boredom. John Boston, The Prison Litigation
Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 438
(2001).
10. Royal, 375 F.3d at 727 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
11. See id. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 726 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
13. Julie M. Riewe, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in
Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE
L.J. 117, 119 (1997).
14. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1555,
1578 (2003). In introducing the legislation, Senator Bob Dole referred to a
"litigation explosion now plaguing our country." 141 CONG. REC. S 14,413
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
15. See infra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
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notorious frivolous prisoner claims. The most touted among these
included suits for an unsatisfactory haircut, disappointment at not
being invited to a pizza party, having inadequate locker space, and
being served chunky instead of creamy peanut butter.
16
These cases, though purportedly examples of actual prisoner
suits, are hardly representative of prisoner suits as a whole. Nor do
they reflect the merits of cases brought by prisoners subjected to
egregious violations of their civil rights. 17 Section 1997e(e), entitled
"Limitation on recovery," provides that "[n]o Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury."' 8 This language
is the subject of multiple judicial interpretations, and in the words of
one commentator, § 1997e(e) "may well present the highest
concentration of poor drafting in the smallest number of words in the
entire United States Code."'19
This Note addresses the current circuit split regarding
application of § 1997e(e), and argues that the subsection should not
operate so as to bar compensatory damages for prisoners'
meritorious First Amendment claims. Part II presents a brief over-
view of the PLRA. Part I1 describes the two divergent readings that
circuit courts currently apply to § 1997e(e), and presents a series of
arguments counseling against an application of § 1997e(e) that
would limit First Amendment prisoner claims. Finally, Part IV
concludes that § 1997e(e) should not be applied to bar those claims.
II. BACKGROUND: THE PLRA, A PRIMER
The PLRA is a sweeping piece of legislation comprised of many
provisions, each aimed at inhibiting prisoner civil rights claims either
by erecting barriers to access, removing incentives to file claims, or
imposing punitive consequences for filing claims found to be abusive
16. Daniel J. Sharfstein, Case Note, No Cure for a Broken Heart: Davis v.
District of Columbia, 108 YALE L.J. 2451, 2452-53 (1999) (citing 141 CONG.
REC. S 14, 413-14 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
17. See, e.g., Royal 375 F.3d at 722; Jennifer Winslow, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious
Lawsuits: Was It Meant to?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1666 (2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000) (emphasis added).
19. Boston, supra note 9, at 434.
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or meritless.
20
For example, the legislation requires that indigent prisoners,
unlike other indigents, pay the full amount of filing fees-regardless
of their ability to pay and regardless of how long it may take to earn
the money to pay.2 1 This represents a significant barrier to access
because prisoners are often paid little or nothing for their labor.
22
Prisoners are also required to exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing suit.2 3 Additionally, courts are severely restricted in the
amount of attorney fees they can award successful prisoner
24litigants. The PLRA also incorporates a "three strikes" provision
that prohibits prisoners from proceeding informa pauperis if three or
more suits brought by that prisoner have been dismissed on grounds
of being frivolous or malicious-unless the prisoner can show
"imminent danger of serious physical injury."25  Finally, the Act
allows for revocation of prisoners' good time credits if the court
finds that the prisoner has filed a claim for purposes of harassment or
other malicious purposes-thus effectively extending incarceration
for prisoners found to have filed such claims.
2 6
Proponents of the PLRA characterized it as a necessary measure
to curtail massive abuse of the judicial process by prisoners filing
meritless claims. 27 This "claim of 'deluge,"' as Professor Margo
Schlanger points out, necessarily implies a trend of increasing
prisoner litigiousness. 28 However, the numbers do not support this
20. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. & 42
U.S.C.).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b) (2000).
22. Boston, supra note 9, at 430. A filing fee of in excess of $100, for
example, could require months of labor to pay off. See, e.g., Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999) (indicating that a prisoner
laboring in the cafeteria was paid twenty cents per hour).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
24. See id- § 1997e(d) (providing that fees must be incurred in proving an
actual violation of prisoner's rights and must be proportionate to the relief
obtained); cf id. § 1988(b) (providing that nonprisoner litigants may be
awarded "reasonable" fees in civil rights cases).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
26. Id. § 1932. The provisions set forth here are by no means exhaustive.
For a more complete listing and discussion, see Schlanger, supra note 14, at
1627-33.
27. Schlanger, supra note 14, at 1578.
28. Id. at 1585.
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proposition. Congressional proponents of the Act frequently cited
the statistic that prisoner filings had increased from 6,606 in 1975 to
39,065 by 1994. 9 An argument based on absolute numbers alone
fails to take into account the explosion in the prisoner population
during those years. Between 1975 and 1994, the total population in
30state and federal prisons increased from 253,816 to 990,147. When
jail inmates are factored in, the total prisoner population in 1994 fell
just short of 1.5 million.3'
Thus, while prison litigation increased more than five fold
between 1975 and 1994, litigation rates per prisoner had actually
plateaued and begun to fall slightly by the time the PLRA was
enacted in 1996. In fact, litigation rates among prisoners had fallen
seventeen percent between 1980 and 1996.32
Other aspects of PLRA's passage call into question the scrutiny
it received in Congress. The legislation was passed as a rider to an
appropriations bill and, as the Seventh Circuit noted, "[i]ts provisions
were never seriously debated," nor was it the subject of a committee
mark-up or a committee report. 33 As one commentator observed, the
PLRA's passage was "characterized by haste and lack of any real
debate."3  Further, while the PLRA as a whole appears to have
received only cursory congressional review, § 1997e(e) seems to
have received the least scrutiny. One scholar commented, "No
aspect of the PLRA received less congressional deliberation than
§ 1997e(e)."35
29. Winslow, supra note 17, at 1662-63; see also Walter Berns, Editorial,
Sue the Warden, Sue the Chef, Sue the Gardner... , WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
1995, at A12 (discussing these statistics).
30. See Schlanger, supra note 14, at 1583 (tbl. 1A).
31. See id.
32. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS, 1980-96, at iii (1997); see also Schlanger, supra note 14, at
1585, 1583 tbl. 1A, 1585 (demonstrating that litigation rates had begun to fall
off before dropping dramatically after PLRA's passage).
33. McCoy v. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 510 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
Geoffrey C. Rapp, Note, Low Riding, 110 YALE L.J. 1089, 1092-93 (2001)).
34. Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress
and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998).
35. James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 105, 114 (2000). Judge Heaney also noted, "[Tihere is almost nothing
in the legislative history as to § 1997e(e) at all." Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d
720, 729 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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A review of the Senate record confirms these observations.
Discussing the PLRA as a whole, Senator Dole merely stated, "it
prohibits prisoners from suing the Government for mental or
emotional injury, absent a prior showing of physical injury." 36 The
record does not define the scope of the proposed legislation, nor does
it discuss its intended effects upon meritorious First Amendment
prisoner claims.
37
Given the lack of any serious scrutiny of the subsection's
purpose, meaning, or intended effect, it is hardly surprising that
§ 1997e(e) has produced inconsistent judicial application and has
served to stifle not only frivolous litigation, but meritorious
constitutional claims as well.
HI. ANALYSIS
A. The Current Circuit Split: Two Divergent Readings of§ 1997e(e)
The prisoner claims that the PLRA was designed to curtail are
those primarily brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which grants an
express right of action to any person whose rights under the U.S.
Constitution are violated under the auspices of state law, against the
person who violates those rights. 38 Prisoner § 1983 claims are
typically brought in federal court against state correctional facilities
and their officials or employees. 39  Litigants bringing suit under
§ 1983 may seek remedies similar to those available to common law
tort litigants. 40  These include compensatory damages, punitive
36. 141 CONG. REc. S14,414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
37. See id.
38. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 726 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Canell v.
Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing prisoner § 1983
claim for free exercise violation).
40. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-57 (1978).
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41damages, and injunctive relief, where appropriate.
Section 1997e(e), however, has been universally construed to
limit the types of remedies available to prisoner-litigants for
42particular claims. Typically, § 1997e(e) is applied to bar
compensatory damages in prisoner suits while leaving punitive
damages and injunctive relief available-provided the prerequisites
for those remedies are alleged and proved by the prisoner-plaintiff.
43
There is no consensus among the federal circuits, however, as to
which types of claims § 1997e(e) ought to apply. By its terms,
§ 1997e(e) may appear to limit remedies for claims "brought by a
prisoner.., for mental or emotional injury.., without a prior
showing of physical injury."44 In other words, § 1997e(e) appears to
require a showing of prior physical injury when the prisoner-plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury. Courts,
however, disagree about which types of claims are for mental or
emotional injury.
When a prisoner's claim alleges violation of a constitutional
right involving bodily integrity, such as an Eighth Amendment
claim, the physical injury requirement appears reasonable in light of
the PLRA's purpose of curtailing frivolous prisoner suits. 45 This is
because these types of suits, if meritorious, are likely to have
demonstrated some physical injury. However, when courts
characterize violations of intangible rights, such as those protected
by the First Amendment, as suits "for mental or emotional injury,"
prisoner-plaintiffs with meritorious claims are left without
meaningful remedy because such claims can rarely, if ever,
demonstrate the required physical injury.46
41. Id. at 256-257.
42. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 723.
43. See, e.g., id. But see Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that § 1997e(e) bars both compensatory and punitive
damages without a prior showing of physical injury).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
45. See Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 n.21 (D.
Mass. 2001) ("Because Eighth Amendment claims are akin to conventional
actions for tort damages (though the duty is imposed by the Constitution and
federal statute rather than the common law), it is more appropriate to require a
causal connection between the state's breach and the plaintiff's demonstrable
injury."); see also Royal, 375 F.3d at 730 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing
the purpose of PRLA).
46. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 730 (Heaney, J. dissenting); Dipaolo, 138 F.
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Currently, there is a split among the federal circuits regarding
whether the limitation on recovery provision found in § 1997e(e)
should enjoy a broad or narrow reading.47 Circuits preferring a broad
reading have interpreted § 1997e(e) to encompass constitutional
claims of a typically nonphysical nature (primarily First
Amendment).48 Courts in these circuits have, therefore, held that
prisoners who bring suit for First Amendment violations are
precluded from compensatory damage awards without a "prior
showing of physical injury. 4 9  Other circuits, in contrast, have
applied a narrow reading of § 1997e(e) that does not view the statute
as imposing a bar to compensatory damages for First Amendment
claims.
50
This split in authority can largely be traced to the ambiguity of
§ 1997e(e)'s language, and the lack of legislative history surrounding
its passage.5 1 Yet, no court has applied the language of § 1997e(e)
literally, as such a reading would completely bar any "Federal civil
action.., brought by a prisoner... for mental or emotional
injury ... without a prior showing of physical injury,', 52 and would
Supp. 2d at 108 ("The First Amendment... is not concerned with preventing
physical abuse by government agents, but rather with the invasion of the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment...
[to] reserve from all official control.") (internal quotes omitted).
47. The "broad" and "narrow" classifications used in this Note are derived
from Molly R. Schimmels, First Amendment Suits and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's 'Physical Injury Requirement': The Availability of Damage
Awards for Inmate Claimants, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 935 (2003) (arguing that §
1997e(e) is properly construed to bar compensatory damage awards for First
Amendment prisoner claims).
48. Section 1997e(e) has also been applied to bar claims for compensation
for Fourteenth Amendment discrimination and equal protection violations.
See, e.g., Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (holding that
§ 1997e(e) barred compensatory damages when African-American inmate
alleged intentional discrimination in furlough program).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
50. See, e.g., Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998)
(allowing plaintiff's Free Exercise claim to proceed without showing of
"mental or emotional injury."); Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98 Civ. 2663 (JGK),
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999) ("The injury
occasioned by a violation of a plaintiff's First Amendment rights is not a'mental or emotional' injury.").
51. See, e.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 729-30 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2002)
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likely render it unconstitutional.53 As the Seventh Circuit noted,
"there is a point beyond which Congress may not restrict the
availability of judicial remedies for the violations of constitutional
rights. 54  Such a limitation would render those rights empty
promises without meaningful value.
To side step this difficulty, courts have looked to the
subsection's title, "Limitation on recovery," to determine that
§ 1997e(e) limits the types of recovery available for claims falling
within its purview, not the types of claims that prisoners may bring.
55
Because § 1997e(e) is not construed to bar punitive damages,
nominal damages, or injunctive relief, prisoner litigants are, at least
theoretically, left with some prospect for remedy. Section 1997e(e)
has been held constitutional on these grounds.
56
B. The Broad Reading of§ 1997e(e)
Circuits interpreting § 1997e(e) broadly include the Third, the
Tenth, the D.C. Circuit, and now, with its decision in Royal, the
Eighth Circuit. 57 Each of these courts has held that the subsection
precludes compensatory damages for prisoner-plaintiffs alleging
First Amendment violations absent a preliminary showing of
physical injury. 58 Additionally, they generally hold that § 1997e(e)
does not bar either punitive damages or injunctive relief.
59
(noting that § 1997e(e) can be read so as to preclude any prisoner suit alleging
only emotional injury).
53. See Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Congress may
not effectively nullify the rights guaranteed by the Constitution by prohibiting
all remedies for the violation of those rights.").
54. Id. at 462.
55. See, e.g., Thompson, 284 F.3d at 418 ("[A]lthough title of statute cannot
limit the statute's plain meaning, it can shed light on otherwise ambiguous
language."); see also Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003)
("As its title suggests, § 1997e(e) is a 'limitation on recovery.').
56. Zehner, 133 F.3d at 462.
57. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722-23 (8th Cir. 2004); Searles v.
Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d
247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
58. See, e.g., Allah, 226 F.3d at 250 ("Under §1997e(e), however, in order
to bring a claim for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody, a
prisoner must allege physical injury.").
59. The one dissenter from this group is the D.C. Circuit, which has held
that § 1997e(e) not only bars compensatory damages but punitive damages as
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1. The Underpinnings of the Broad Reading-
Remedies Available Under § 1983 Are Linked to Those
Available for Common Law Torts.
Tort law requires that a plaintiff allege "actual injury" in the
form of physical injury or mental or emotional harm.60 This
principle, and its application by the Supreme Court in two decisions,
is the basic rationale of the circuits applying a broad interpretation of
§ 1997e(e). 6 1 The Supreme Court has stated that in enacting § 1983,
Congress created a "species of tort liability." 62 Thus, the principles
governing remedies for § 1983 claims are tied to those applied in the
common law of torts.
In the first of these cases, Carey v. Piphus,63 the Supreme Court
considered a § 1983 claim brought by students alleging they were
suspended from public schools without adequate procedural due
process. 64 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
students could recover substantial compensatory damages upon a
mere showing that their rights had been denied, even without proof
of actual injury.65 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
students could not recover compensatory damages without proof that
the denial of their rights had, in fact, caused mental or emotional
harm.66  Accordingly, the students were only entitled to nominal
well. Davis, 158 F.3d at 1348. Thus there is actually a three-way split among
the circuits. The rationale provided by the D.C. Circuit is that "Congress's
evident intent [to curtail frivolous prisoner suits] would be thwarted if
prisoners could surmount § 1997e(e) simply by adding a claim for punitive
damages." Id. This reasoning appears particularly dubious given that a
plaintiff must first establish a valid claim before being awarded punitive
damages. Since the claim must be meritorious to be compensable, it follows
that Congressional intent would not be thwarted if that intent is in fact
curtailment of frivolous claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
cmt. c (1979) ("It is essential.., that facts be established that, apart from
punitive dmages, are sufficient to maintain a cause of action.").
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 724 ("Royal may not recover some
indescribable and indefinite damage allegedly arising from a violation of his
constitutional rights."); Allah, 226 F.3d at 250 ("[S]ubstantial damages may
only be awarded to compensate for actual injury suffered as a result of the
violation of a constitutional fight.").
62. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
63. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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damages.
67
In the second case, Memphis Community School District v.
Stachura,68 the Court reviewed a jury charge in a § 1983 case.
There, the plaintiff claimed he had been unconstitutionally deprived
of property without due process and that his First Amendment right
to academic freedom had been abridged when he was suspended
from his teaching position.6 9 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan had instructed the jury that it could
award compensatory damages upon finding that the plaintiff's
constitutional rights had been violated. 70 The district court further
instructed jurors that,
[t]he precise value you place upon any Constitutional right
which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your
discretion. You may wish to consider the importance of the
right in our system of government, the role which this right
has played in the history of our republic, [and] the
significance of the right in the context of the activities
which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the
violation of the right.71
The Supreme Court held this instruction to be inconsistent with
Carey, and therefore improper, because it did not square with
common law tort principles.72 Instead of addressing "compensation
for provable injury," the instructions focused "on the jury's
subjective perception of the importance of constitutional rights as an
abstract matter.",
73
While the Carey plaintiffs were precluded from recovering a
wholly arbitrary amount in compensation for deprivation of their
rights, they were entitled to nominal damages.74 The Carey court
explains that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff
proves a prima facie claim for deprivation of rights but is unable to
67. Id.
68. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
69. Id. at 301-302.
70. Id. at 302.
71. Id. at 303.
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id.
74. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978). Nominal damages
generally consist of a trivial award, frequently $1.00. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 221 (2d ed. 1993).
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prove "actual injury."75 Nominal damages are awarded to
vindicat[e] deprivations of certain "absolute" rights that are
not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of
a nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of
such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof
of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to
organized society that those rights be scrupulously
observed.76
Thus, an award of nominal damages recognizes that a violation
of rights has occurred, but avoids a jury award of compensatory
damages amounting to a theoretical or arbitrary valuation of the
deprived right.77
2. Courts Reading § 1997e(e) Broadly
Do Not Recognize that First Amendment Violations
Are Compensable, Notwithstanding Actual Injuries
The broad reading of § 1997e(e) rests, to a large extent on the
proposition that Carey and Stachura effectively limit § 1983 litigants
to compensation for actual injuries-either monetary, physical, or
mental/emotional.78  These courts hold this to be true,
notwithstanding the character of the underlying violation. For
example, a prisoner who alleges an Eighth Amendment violation,
after being sexually assaulted and suffering cuts and bruises as a
result of being placed in a cell with another inmate, is entitled to
compensation for his physical and emotional injuries. 79 However, a
prisoner who brings a First Amendment free exercise claim and does
not allege "actual injury" in the form of physical or mental/emotional
injuries is precluded from recovering compensatory damages under
Carey and Stachura.
80
75. Carey, 435 U.S. at 266.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Kemner v. Hemphill, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (N.D. Fla.
2002) ("Carey and Stachura plainly require that compensatory damages in a
§ 1983 suit be based on actual injury caused by the defendant rather than the
abstract value of the constitutional rights that may have been violated....
Actual injuries typically are physical, emotional or fiscal in character.")
(internal quotes omitted).
79. See id. at 1266-70.
80. See, e.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (noting that "damages other than nominal damages require compensable
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Accordingly, this approach holds that § 1983 plaintiffs cannot
recover regardless of the fact that First Amendment violations by
their nature do not typically produce "actual injuries." In fact, it is
difficult to imagine a First Amendment violation that, standing alone,
would produce such injuries.
3. Once § 1997e(e) Is Applied Broadly,
§ 1983 Prisoner Litigants Are Left with Only Nominal Damages
When these courts apply § 1997e(e) over the limitations they
construe Carey and Stachura to impose on § 1983 claims, the
remedies available to prisoner litigants bringing First Amendment
claims become even more restricted. Because these courts read
Carey and Stachura to prohibit recovery of compensatory damages
without a showing of "actual injury," when the plaintiff fails to plead
physical injury, a prayer for compensatory damages is treated as one
for "mental or emotional injury." Because these courts do not
recognize that the plaintiff can be compensated for the violation
itself,s and because § 1997e(e) precludes recovery "without a prior
showing of physical injury,"8 2 he or she is left with only nominal
damages; a result that the Seventh Circuit has conceded is wholly
inadequate.
83
4. The Broad Reading Misconstrues
the Law Governing Remedies for First Amendment Violations
This line of reasoning, however, construes the case law
governing damages for § 1983 claims too narrowly and completely
ignores an entire body of law holding that First Amendment
violations are, themselves, compensable injuries exclusive of any
injury.") (citing Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978)).
81. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Allah seeks
substantial damages for the harm he suffered as a result of defendants' alleged
violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.... [T]he
only actual injury that could form the basis for the award he seeks would be
mental and/or emotional injury.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
83. See Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying
compensation to prisoners for mental/emotional injury caused by fear of
potential cancer due to asbestos exposure while working in the prison kitchen
since, "[f]or the[se] plaintiffs, injunctive relief offers no comfort
whatsoever.... If these plaintiffs are to be compensated for that fear at all, it
must be by damages").
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physical, mental or emotional harm. Writing in a separate,
concurring opinion in Stachura, Justice Marshall remarked that, "[A]
First Amendment-protected interest could itself constitute
compensable injury wholly apart from any 'emotional distress,
humiliation and personal indignity, emotional pain, [or]... anguish
suffered by plaintiffs.' '' 84  This rule squares with the majority's
holding since such "injury could be compensated with substantial
damages only to the extent that [they are] reasonably quantifiable;
damages should not be based on the so-called inherent value of the
rights violated.,
85
In other words, all that Carey and Stachura require is that the
compensatory "award... be proportional to the actual loss
sustained. '' 86 Because courts recognize that a "wooden" application
of common law actual injury requirements cannot typically remedy
First Amendment violations, they have continued to allow plaintiffs
to recover for the violation of First Amendment and other intangible
rights themselves.
87
When compared to a similar case previously decided by the
same court, Royal vividly illustrates the effect a broad reading of
§ 1997e(e) has on First Amendment cases. Five years prior to Royal,
the Eighth Circuit handed down a decision in Trobaugh v. Hall,88 a
prisoner case with facts strikingly similar to those in Royal. In that
case, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's award of
nominal damages even though, like Royal, Trobaugh had been
placed in isolation to prevent him from filing claims against prison
authorities and was subsequently found to have been subjected to
retaliation by prison officials. 89 The Trobaugh court did not address
§ 1997e(e), 9° and instead concluded that the "[d]istrict [c]ourt abused
84. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 315 (1986)




87. See, e.g., id. at 314-16; Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70 of
Cleveland County, 766 F.2d 1391, 1408-1413 (10th Cir. 1985); Hobson, 737
F.2d at 57-63; Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Va. 1978).
88. 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999).
89. Id. at 1088.
90. See id. at 1088-89. Although Trobaugh was decided after the
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its discretion by awarding only $1 in damages for Hall's violation of
Trobaugh's First Amendment rights."91 The circuit court remanded,
suggesting that a more appropriate award would be in the range of
$100.00 per day for each of the days Trobaugh spent in isolation.92
It is important to note that the Trobaugh court did not
characterize the damage award as being for mental or emotional
injury, but rather as being for the First Amendment violation itself.
93
Of equal importance is the fact that this characterization is outside
the traditional "actual injury" construct applied in tort law, as
addressed in Carey,94 but is consistent with Justice Marshall's
concurrence in Stachura.
95
The Royal court, when presented with facts that were essentially
identical to Trobaugh, albeit far more egregious, 96 declined to follow
its holding.97  The Royal court, however, did not meaningfully
distinguish the cases, except to say that Trobaugh did not consider
§ 1997e(e) in its decision. 98 The Royal court focused on the statute's
phrase "no [flederal civil action," and concluded that since the
language does not distinguish between the types of federal claims to
which the subsection should apply, Congress must have intended
First Amendment claims to be included within its reach. 99
In Trobaugh, the damages were not awarded for emotional
injury but, as the court explicitly stated, for "violation of Trobaugh's
First Amendment rights."100 Similarly, Royal did not sue for mental
or emotional injury; he sued for violation of his First Amendment
rights. In other words, § 1997e(e), by its terms, does not mandate
enactment of § 1997e(e), the court curiously does not mention the statute or
any other provision of the PLRA.
91. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1089. The court not only reversed the nominal compensatory
award, but also asked the district court to reconsider its denial of punitive
damages because the prison officials' denial of Trobaugh's First Amendment
right to file grievances amounted to "reckless or callous indifference." Id.
93. Id. at 1088.
94. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978).
95. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
96. While Trobaugh was placed in segregation for only three days,
Trobaugh, 176 F.3d at 1088, Royal spent fifty-six days in isolation, Royal v.
Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
97. Royal, 375 F.3d at 724 n.2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 723.
100. Trobaugh, 176 F.3d at 1088.
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preclusion of compensatory damages in First Amendment cases
because, as Trobaugh demonstrates, some measure of damages can
be awarded to compensate the violation of the constitutional right
itself. Damages for these infringements need not be characterized as
strictly "actual," or fit within neat categories of monetary, physical,
or emotional harms. This is the reasoning Justice Marshall advanced
in Stachura and which the Trobaugh court followed.
C. The Narrow Reading
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Governing Damages for
§ 1983 Does Not Mandate Characterizing
First Amendment Claims As Seeking to Remedy Mental or
Emotional Injury
Courts that read § 1997e(e) narrowly tend to focus on the
underlying nature of the claim itself. They recognize that First
Amendment suits are not brought "for mental or emotional injury,"
but rather to remedy the deprivation of the constitutional right
itself.1° 1  This reading of the statute is consistent with Justice
Marshall's concurrence in Stachura, and appreciates the fundamental
difference between claims for deprivation of intangible rights and
those more closely aligned with common law tort claims for physical
injury or mental or emotional harm.1°2  Thus, under a narrow
reading, prisoners bringing First Amendment claims need not meet
§ 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement since they are not suits "for
mental or emotional injury."
The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to consider the
application of § 1997e(e) to a First Amendment claim. In Canell v.
Lightner,10 3 the court reasoned that § 1997e(e) did not bar the
plaintiffs free exercise claim because he was "not asserting a claim
for mental or emotional injury," but rather "for violation of his First
101. See, e.g., Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998);
Waters v. Andrews, No. 97-CV-407A(F), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16004, at
*24 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2000).
102. See, e.g., Barnes v. Ramos, No. 94 C 7541, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15260, at *7-8 (N.D. 111. Oct. 11, 1996) (Plaintiff "has not brought this suit to
recover damages for mental or emotional injuries suffered as a consequence of
defendants' actions. Rather, he alleges that his constitutional rights were
violated ....").
103. 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Amendment rights."'1 4  Moreover, the court observed that "[t]he
deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial
relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any
mental or emotional injury he may have incurred." 10 5 As a result,
"§ 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment Claims [sic]
regardless of the form of relief sought."'
1 6
This approach does not altogether ignore Carey and Stachura,
but recognizes that constitutional claims brought to vindicate
intangible rights are fundamentally different from common law tort
claims redressing physical or emotional injury. The Ninth Circuit's
approach in Canell, in the earlier words of Justice Marshall,
recognizes that a "wooden application of common-law damages
rules"'1 7 is not appropriate where intangible rights have been
violated, and that the rule should be "tailored to the interests
protected by the particular right in question."'
0 8
After Canell, the Seventh Circuit, 109 as well as district courts
within the First"0 and Second"' Circuits adopted similar reasoning
in holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar First Amendment claims.
The Seventh Circuit stated that, "It would be a serious mistake to
interpret section 1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in
all prisoner civil rights suits. The domain of the statute is limited to
104. Il at 1213 (internal quotes omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 314 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
108. Id. (quoting Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)).
109. Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 1999).
110. See, e.g., Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.
Mass. 2001).
111. See, e.g., Lipton v. County of Orange, 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[A] First Amendment deprivation presents a cognizable
injury standing alone and the PLRA does not bar a separate award of damages
to compensate the plaintiff for the First Amendment violation in and of itself.")
(internal quotes omitted); Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98 Civ. 2663 (JGK), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999) ("The injury
occasioned by a violation of a plaintiff's First Amendment rights is not a
'mental or emotional' injury in the same sense as [the types of claims that
traditionally involve the terms mental or emotional] injuries. Thus § 1997e(e)
does not bar the plaintiff's First Amendment claims ....").
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suits in which mental or emotional injury is claimed."' 1 2 Because
First Amendment plaintiffs do not claim mental or emotional injury,
but seek redress for the denial of the right itself, § 1997e(e) is not
implicated. 113
2. The Language of § 1997e(e) Does Not Mandate
Inclusion of First Amendment Claims
Courts have also refused to apply § 1997e(e) to First
Amendment claims based on the language of the statute itself.
Several courts have noted that if § 1997e(e) applies to all federal
claims by prisoners, then the phrase "for mental or emotional injury"
is superfluous.
114
In other words, if Congress intended the statute to apply to all
federal claims it should simply read, "no [f]ederal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner without a prior showing of physical injury."
Instead, Congress specifically identified claims that are "for mental
or emotional injury" as requiring a showing of physical injury.
115
Since First Amendment claims are not "for mental or emotional
injury," the intent of Congress must not have been to impede such
claims. This reading comports with the notion that all words in a
statute should be read to have meaning.' 
16
3. There Is Nothing in the Congressional Record Suggesting
that First Amendment Claims Are Covered by § 1997e(e)
Another justification for the narrow interpretation of § 1997e(e)
is the absence in the PRLA's legislative history of any intent by
Congress to limit otherwise actionable First Amendment claims.
When a statute may be interpreted in more than one way it is
ambiguous, and thus it is appropriate to look to legislative history to
determine the intent of the lawmakers. 17  Section 1997e(e) is
properly characterized as ambiguous given the multiplicity of
interpretations applied to it. 118 It is therefore proper to look to the
112. Robinson, 170 F.3d at 748.
113. See id.
114. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 729 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting); Amaker, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *21-22.
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
116. Amaker, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *22.
117. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 729 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
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legislative history of the statute to divine the likely intent of
Congress.
Because Congress focused on claims concerning conditions of
confinement, one example of which concerned the type of peanut
butter an inmate was served, it is unlikely that lawmakers intended
§ 1997e(e) to serve as a bar for meritorious First Amendment
claims.119 It is also unlikely that Congress intended to immunize
state prison officials from suits for violations of prisoners' intangible
rights.1 20 Although the congressional record is sparse, 121 there is no
evidence that Congress intended § 1997e(e) to result in the virtual
elimination of all effective remedies for inmates with meritorious
claims.'
2 2
4. Judicial Nullification, Notwithstanding § 1997e(e)
While some courts distinguish First Amendment claims from
those that allege physical or emotional injury, other courts that
construe § 1997e(e) narrowly simply refuse to apply the statute to
First Amendment cases. These courts recognize that applying
§ 1997e(e) to intangible rights claims effectively immunizes state
prison officials from suit. Finding this result unconscionable, they
have held that § 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment claims
even if the statute is read to encompass them. A prime example of
this phenomenon is Warburton v. Underwood,123 a New York district
court decision:
[T]he Court recognizes that some highly significant
constitutional claims, such as those addressing an inmate's
rights under the Establishment Clause, may not strictly
comply with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)....
However, the Court finds that such claims nevertheless
deserve to be heard, and thus the Court declines to dismiss
the Establishment Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
despite the fact that the only injury plaintiff could
119. See Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 718-19 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
120. See id. at 718.
121. Royal, 375 F.3d at 729 n.5 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
122. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 729 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("There is nothing
in the legislative history of § 1997e(e)... to suggest that Congress's intent
was to prevent legitimate constitutional claims simply because the prisoner
suffered no physical injury."); Mason, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19.
123. 2 F. Supp. 2d 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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experience as a result of a constitutional violation under the
Establishment Clause would be mental or emotional.' 24
New York is not the only state in which district court judges
engage in nullification. Prior to the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Royal, district courts within the Eighth Circuit were split on the
application of § 1997e(e). 125  In Mason v. Schriro,126 now likely
implicitly overruled by Royal,127 the court quoted a commentator
who wrote, "[w]here constitutional rights are at stake and where
Congress leaves the federal courts with authority to grant only
plainly inadequate relief, it sets itself against the Constitution."'
2 8
Instead of excluding intangible rights from § 1997e(e) on the basis of
the injury alleged, the Mason court simply refused to apply the
statute because doing so would license prison officials' wholesale
violation of prisoners' intangible rights: "The court would, in effect,
interpret section 1997e(e) as granting prison officials immunity from
suit even where there is blatant and systematic racial or religious
discrimination."'129 This would, in effect, deny those rights entirely
by "rendering them utterly hollow promises."
130
5. Application of § 1997e(e) to First Amendment Claims
Is Not Necessary to Effectuate Congressional Intent
A further justification for declining to apply § 1997e(e) to First
Amendment claims is that other provisions of the PLRA provide
federal courts with sufficient tools to weed out meritless First
Amendment suits.13 1 These include the power of the court to sua
sponte dismiss a claim brought in forma pauperis "at any time if the
court determines that-the action or appeal-is frivolous or
124. Id. at 315.
125. Compare Mason, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 719 (adopting narrow
interpretation), with Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961 (S.D. Iowa
2002) (adopting broad interpretation).
126. 45 F. Supp. 2d 709 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
127. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004).
128. Mason, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 719 (quoting Lawrence Gene Sager,
Constitutional Limitations on Congress Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV L. REV. 17, 88 (1981)).
129. Id. at 719.
130. Id.
131. Royal, 375 F.3d at 730-31 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see also Winslow,
supra note 17, at 1671-72.
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malicious. ' 32 Dismissal can occur even before service is made on
defendants so that any expense or inconvenience they would
otherwise incur is avoided. 33 This provision, in force prior to the
passage of the PLRA,134 exists in addition to the many other hurdles
the PLRA places before prisoner litigants.
35
These provisions, without § 1997e(e)'s application to First
Amendment claims, are sufficient to give effect to Congress' intent
to curb frivolous prisoner litigation. 136  It is, therefore, wholly
unnecessary to apply § 1997e(e) in circumstances where its
application effectively licenses disregard of prisoners' intangible
rights. This is particularly true where there is no direct evidence,
either in the statute or in the congressional record, that Congress
intended § 1997e(e) to apply to such claims.'
37
D. The Insufficiency of Remedies Under a Broad Reading
Section 1997e(e)'s effective denial of rights by limitation of
remedy is not ameliorated by the theoretical possibility that a
prisoner-plaintiff might obtain either punitive damages or injunctive
relief. A broad reading not only deprives successful suits of any
deterrent value, but it generally leaves plaintiffs with no effective
remedy. As previously discussed, most courts construing § 1997e(e)
broadly have held that the subsection bars compensation for claims
deemed to be "for mental or emotional injury," but leaves punitive
e.138, u 
evspntv
damages and injunctive relief available. The effect of this
application is not limited to depriving prisoner-plaintiffs
compensation for violations of their First Amendment rights. It also
robs prisoners' First Amendment claims of any deterrent value they
may otherwise carry.
Compensatory damages awarded in § 1983 cases are not solely
intended to compensate the victim. They are also designed to deter
further constitutional violations.' 39 Unlike compensatory damage
132. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
133. See Winslow, supra note 17, at 1671 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
134. See id.
135. See discussion supra Part II.
136. See Royal, 375 F.3d at 730-31 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 729 n.5.
138. See discussion supra Part III.B.
139. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986)
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awards, the nominal damages awarded as a substitute, in cases such
as Royal, carry no deterrent value. The ultimate effect of this is the
de facto immunization of prison officials who violate prisoners' First
Amendment rights.
This fact is further compounded by the insufficiency of punitive
damages and injunctive relief that are rarely available to prisoner
litigants. The purpose of punitive damages is to both "punish the
defendant for his willful or malicious conduct and to deter others
from similar behavior." 140  Such damages are available when a
"defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others." 141 While theoretically available
to plaintiffs bringing First Amendment claims, punitive damages are
rarely awarded. 142 This barrier to relief is heightened by the fact that
juries are likely to be suspicious of prisoner litigants in the first
place, and therefore unlikely to find for prisoner-litigants except
where the facts are unusually compelling. 1
43
In addition to the rarity of punitive awards, injunctive relief is
similarly illusory because prisoners are often transferred to other
facilities or released before their claims are fully adjudicated, thus
rendering moot any prayer for injunctive relief.144 This was the case
for Jeff Royal, as upon his release from IMCC, his claim for
("Section 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm
ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.").
140. Id. at 306 n.9.
141. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
142. Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Public
Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35
GA. L. REV. 939, 974-975 (2001) ("Punitive damages are rarely available in
First Amendment retaliation cases, for they may be awarded only where the
defendant's conduct was highly improper. These limits on relief suggest that a
plaintiff who wins on the merits may find that the victory is not worth much as
a practical matter.").
143. See Schlanger, supra note 14, at 1606-07.
144. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the power of federal courts to
adjudicate depends upon "the existence of a case or controversy.... [W]here
intervening events resolve a potential controversy with 'no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated,' a case becomes moot and a
federal court is stripped of its authority to exert jurisdiction over the matter."
Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 (D. Mass. 2001)
(holding that "transfer from an institution under the aegis of [one correctional
facility to another] renders [plaintiff's] request for injunctive relief... moot").
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injunctive relief was moot.' 45 In other cases, prisoners' claims for
prospective relief are often rendered moot by a transfer from one
facility to another, or by personnel changes following the alleged
rights violations.
146
Because the prospect for punitive damages and injunctive relief
are largely illusory for prisoner-litigants, when § 1997e(e) is applied
to bar compensatory damages for First Amendment claims, these
plaintiffs are left with no remedy save nominal damages. Were
injunctive relief available, such plaintiffs would still be left without
compensation for deprivation of their rights as injunctive relief
concerns only future violations. 147 In this way, a broad application
of § 1997e(e) denies prisoner-litigants whose First Amendment
rights have been violated any meaningful remedy, and effectively
licenses state prison officials to violate such rights without fear of
civil consequences.
IV. CONCLUSION
By construing § 1997e(e) broadly so as to encompass legitimate
First Amendment claims, courts deprive prisoners of the civil
recourse granted to them under the Constitution and by Congress
under § 1983. This "limitation on recovery"'148 has the effect of
rendering the rights embodied in the First Amendment, and so highly
valued in our society, "hollow promises. ' 149 Furthermore, the denial
of these rights is likely to result in no more than one dollar in civil
liability. °
This result is by no means necessary-the Supreme Court's
145. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, any claim for prospective relief Royal may have had
against the individual official named in the suit was rendered moot upon that
official's retirement. See id. at 722, 725.
146. See, e.g., Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 105; Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d
247, 249 (3d Cir. 2000) (transfer of prisoner from one facility to another
rendered moot a claim for injunctive relief in free exercise case); Davis v.
District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (denying
declaratory relief on standing grounds because rights violation was unlikely to
recur).
147. See Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000).
149. Mason v. Shriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
150. See, e.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 726 (affirming district court's award of $1
nominal damages and denial of punitive damages).
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jurisprudence on § 1983 damages does not require it, the text of
§ 1997e(e) does not compel it, and there is nothing in the
Congressional record suggesting that Congress intended it.
Moreover, federal courts have other, more appropriately tailored,
tools at their disposal to achieve the PLRA's objective of curtailing
frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
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